Mindfulness and Dissociation: Two Competing Opposing States?
Are mindfulness and dissociation complete opposites, or is there something in common? Can mindfulness help with dissociation, or could it trigger or be used to strengthen a dissociative pattern?
Mindfulness and dissociation are two opposing mental states that are often discussed in the context of mental health and psychological well-being. While mindfulness is generally associated with being present in the moment and fully engaged with one’s thoughts and feelings, dissociation involves a disconnection from one’s thoughts, feelings, memories, or sense of identity.
Forner (2017) describes the opposing nature of mindfulness and dissociation as follows,
“In as simple terms as one can surmise, dissociation is often the deficiency of internal and external awareness; mindfulness is internal and external awareness in abundance. One is a brain function that is designed to know; the other is a brain function that is designed to not know.” (ibid. p. xii)
However, an article I was reading by Zerubaved and Messman-Moore (2015) also mentions this, but it further points out how the distinctions and similarities between mindfulness and dissociation have not yet been fully fleshed out. In an attempt to address this, Zerubaved and Messman-Moore point to two definitions, one on dissociation by Walach et al. (2006), who comment,
“Dissociation seems to be the opposite of mindfulness, containing symptoms of amnesia, automaticity without conscious control and the dissociation of cognitive and emotional elements.” (p. 1546)
And how Corrigan (2002) defined mindfulness as a,
“Willed and controlled dissociation, applied for a particular purpose, such as emotion regulation or distress tolerance, rather than the antithesis of dissociation.” (p. 9)
I do not fully agree with Corrigan’s definition, as I view mindfulness as the opposite of dissociation.
Furthermore, in their article, Zerubaved and Messman-Moore (2015) left out the following part of Corrigan’s definition of mindfulness, “rather than the antithesis of dissociation” (p. 9). It is my opinion that including this would have bolstered their argument on the distinctions and similarities between mindfulness and dissociation. Why? Because they mention these to elude that beyond the differences, there might be a common process at work.
Zerubaved and Messman-Moore (2015) clarify that they refer to Forner’s and Corrigan’s definitions not to say that mindfulness and dissociation are the same but to signify that,
“Dissociation involves more than lack of mindfulness, and mindfulness involves more than not dissociating.” (p. 308, ibid.)
They do this to show that, although they are distinct psychological processes, they are not direct opposites, as there might be a common mechanism at work, along with other contrasting processes that might be linking them together, including, “awareness/lack of awareness, staying present/detachment, and connectedness/fragmentation” (Zerubaved & Messman-Moore, 2015, p. 308).
The observer role in mindfulness and dissociation
In addition to these contrasting features, as highlighted by Zerubaved and Messman-Moore (2015), mindfulness and dissociation have one thing in common: the act of becoming an observer. Mindfulness by stepping back to become more aware of experience right now by dropping interpretation with the intention of engaging more fully as a participant in the present moment. On the other hand, dissociation entails detachment as a tool not to feel current experience.
We could say that mindfulness involves an impartial observer that remains fully engaged, participating in momentary experience. Contrastingly, dissociation, as a detached observer, still involves a sense of knowing what’s happening but uses the detached element as a mechanism to blunt out the situation—so being there but not a participant in what happens. This isn’t easy to describe, and sometimes, a common experience people share when they dissociate is that it feels as if they are seeing themselves from outside, seeing what is happening from outside their body.
Or, as Zerubaved and Messman-Moore (2015) eloquently put it,
“In dissociative detachment processes, there is a separation between the experiencing self and the observing self, while in mindfulness, one might say that the experiencing self takes the observer position. For the dissociated watcher, consciousness is external and disconnected……while for the mindful watcher, consciousness is internal and connected.” (p. 309)
Therefore, dissociation involves an observer who lacks control or connection over what is being experienced. In contrast, mindfulness involves an observer who is in conscious, engaged contact and connected to what is being experienced while allowing space for a responsive approach to a situation rather than a reactive one.
Because of this, we could say that mindfulness and dissociation cannot occupy the same space. Applying logic, we could then argue that mindfulness could be used as an intervention to help with dissociative states by grounding the person’s attention into the present experience. However, during meditation practice, sometimes mindfulness and dissociation are confused for each other. This is because the decentring aspect of mindfulness, consciously stepping back, may initially feel as if we are dissociating from our experience (Mendenhall, 2023; Nave et al., 2021) or could potentially be used to dissociate or strengthen a dissociative pattern (Britton, 2019; Masters, 2010).
Indeed, spiritual practices like meditation might be used as a means to avoid an underlying issue, thoughts or emotions by using a contemplative practice to block them out of awareness—a phenomenon initially defined by Welwood (1984) as “spiritual bypassing”.
Further, mindfulness practice is difficult, and I can vouch for this based on my personal experience. Practising mindfulness is not an easy task; to sit down and objectively observe the contents of your experience without passing any judgment or expressing preferences, all while maintaining an attitude of acceptance. It is an act of will, that requires a lot of agency, strength, and discipline. And let us be clear - there is no shame in not being able to do that.
Dissociation a protective mechanism!
Some have also debated that in certain situations, a dissociative response might be the wisest thing at that moment and a necessary automatic response to a shocking, unanswerable situation, or when things are difficult to describe or so overwhelming that they cannot be held in consciousness (Dell & O’Neil, 2010; Forner, 2017). In 1996, looking at studies, Loewenstein remarked how,
“Dissociation is conceptualised as a basic part of the psychobiology of the human trauma response: a protective activation of altered states of consciousness in reaction to overwhelming psychological trauma” (ibid. 1996, p. 312).
So it might be that in a situation of extreme stress, dissociation might function as an automatic defensive, protective or coping mechanism—a self-preserving mechanism, what could be considered as the lesser of two evils (Carlson et al., 2010; Corrigan et al., 2022; Ross et al., 2015). However, this perspective has also been challenged (Lynn et al., 2012).
The problem is that if we are constantly bombarded on a regular basis by extreme stress, we might develop a way of existing in a dysregulated and dissociated state as a base setting.
Because of this, turning inwards might be an almost impossible task for someone who, through their life, might have experienced either situationally or recurringly some form of unbearable physical or/and emotional pain, suffering or psychological and physical abuse. It must be emphasised and made clear that giving someone the instruction to turn their attention inward can trigger or amplify a dysregulated state. Mindfulness can make you dissociate further if there is no context of inner or outward safety.
Mindfulness can trigger dissociation
This is not to say that mindfulness cannot have benefits. However, beyond the established benefits (Goldberg et al., 2022; Goldberg et al., 2018), it is also known that mindfulness can trigger dissociation in individuals who might have gone through a traumatic event in their lives, such as a severe accident, physical or psychological abuse, or the loss of loved ones, especially if these events imprinted into the body (Treleaven, 2018). Why? Because, as mentioned, mindfulness asks us to pay attention to interoceptive sensations, and for someone who might have experienced trauma, interceptors might continue to signal danger even if we are in a safe environment, like a meditation group, even if exteroceptors are signalling the opposite.
Furthermore, we also know from research on potential distressing or adverse effects from meditation that a subset of participants—potentially up to 6%—may experience dissociation from mindfulness, even if there is no history of past trauma (Britton et al., 2021; Lindahl et al., 2017).
So, up to this point, we could say that mindfulness and dissociation are opposites. Therefore, mindfulness might potentially help with dissociation. However, we also determined that mindfulness might also trigger or promote dissociation. So, the question that we need to ask is whether mindfulness can help with dissociation, and if so, what are its limits? This will be the focus of our upcoming article.
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